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The paper deals with demographic aspects of various crises. In particular it reviews 
available but scattered information on the death toll of selected famines, epidemics, 
(civil) wars, genocides, ecological crises, and other catastrophes. 
Its main objective is to put things into perspective. First, the paper demonstrates that 
aggregate statistics are usually inadequate to study the demographic impact of crises. 
There were crises in history that killed millions of people - such as the "Great Leap 
Forward in China - and yet are hardly discernable on a line graph showing the country's 
overall population growth. Second, in recent history, life and well being of people was 
usually endangered by intentional human action such as war, political terror, and genocide 
- not by natural disasters or ecological crises. And third, there is evidence that certain 
lifestyles (such as cigarette smoking) and social patterns (such as frequent change of 
sexual partners) can increase the morbidity and mortality of a population much more 
than anything else (with exception of a nuclear war). It is not the consequences of 
dramatic crises, but slow killers (cigarettes and AIDS) which have the most serious 
demographic impact. 
The paper (indirectly) also rakes a principal question: Is it not rather cynical and 
detached from reality to concentrate enormous intellectual and financial resources on the 
study of possible environmental crises at a time when 
- several hundred million people worldwide are suffering severe malnutrition; 
- famines (triggered by civil wars) are presently killing or injuring half of the 
population of Somalia and Sudan (one-fourth (!) of the children under 5 have 
already died during the last few months); 
- an estimated 10 million people worldwide are infected with a deadly virus, and 
another 20 to 30 million will most likely be infected by the year 2000; 
- millions are tortured by terror regimes in many countries; 
- and bloody civil wars are flaring up all over the world, killing, wounding and 
displacing hundreds of thousands of innocent people? 
While the demographic impact of these events is significant and obvious, the consequences 
of environmental crises are either hypothetical, in the distant future, or relatively minor. 
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POPULATION-RELATED CRISES: A TYPOLOGY 
Gerhard K Heilig 
Crises are a constituency of our existence. Sometimes they affect a whole political system, 
sometimes a small group or an individual, in a few cases they might endanger the 
existence of mankind. This paper deals with demographic causes and consequences of 
crises. Its main objective is to review available, but scattered, information on some of the 
most serious population-related catastrophes. The paper also includes a typology that 
classifies the various events. Finally, problems related to the identification of 
demographic causes and consequences of crises are discussed. In general, the paper tries 
to increase awareness of the broad spectrum of traumatic events that can affect a 
population. 
For our purpose we pragmatically define crises as social, economic, political, natural, or 
demographic events that come unexpected (even if predicted),' evolve rapid3, over a short 
period of time and are difficult or impossible to influence. They suddenly change the 
internal structure of a phenomenon or turn around its long-term trends. This definition 
of crisis might be not very precise or consistent. However, in the course of our discussion, 
we will use examples to specify its meaning. 
To start with, we will distinguish the following types of population-related crises: 
- Famines 
- Epidemics 
- Wars 
- Genocides 
- Systematic terror and suppression 
- Massive displacement and forced migration of peoples 
- Ecological catastrophes 
- Epochal change through multiple crises 
History is full of crises that were well predicted, but still came unexpected to the public, because 
nobody really trusted the prediction. (Greek mythology, by the way, seems to have a special favor for 
this kind of tragic.) Scientists sometimes believe that publishing a doomsday projection or model 
scenario is ~ ~ c i e n t  to make the public aware of a looming disaster. But this is just scientific 
hypocrisy. There were too many false predictions, contradictory projections and irrelevant scenarios 
from social scientists (including economists and demographers) that the public would take their models 
too serious. This could be called the "jive minutes afiet 12" problem: a crisis has to be well under way, 
before the public - including politicians - would accept that the (scientific) predictions were right. 
1. FAMINES 
The classical case of a population-related crisis is famine. For thousands of years, well 
up to early modem societies, famines were an integral part of the human e~istence.~ In 
traditional societies the food supply heavily depended on regional agriculture. Trade was 
difficult, expensive and usually restricted to local (or regional) markets. Crop failure due 
to pests, livestock diseases, or bad weather were quite frequent and a succession of a few 
bad harvests could easily drench available stocks. 
There is some discussion if famines were the primary cause of population stagnation in 
the past - an argument that Malthus made prominent. Based on simulation experiments 
Watkins and Menken have argued that the demographic effects of severe famines both 
in ancient Europe and Asia were quite fleeting: "90 years after the famine, the population 
is ... only 7 percent smaller than it would be had there been no fa~nine".~ There is, 
however, considerable disagreement. Komlos, for instance, provides evidence that in 
early-modern England, population trends were greatly influenced by "localized 
demographic crises, which in turn were related to general agricultural ~onditions".~ 
Well known is the Great Irish Famine (1846-1851). Its precise demographic impact might 
be difficult to quantify: but there can be no doubt that it caused a considerable increase 
of mortality and triggered a wave of emigration. Not too long ago India was notorious 
in its succession of serious famines. Only since the "Green Revolution" has the country 
acquired self-sufficiency in food.6 While India's history of famines caused widespread 
human suffering, it did not stop its high population growth and it did not significantly 
distort its age structure (at least on a national level). 
In recent history a most serious case of mass starvation occurred during the "Great Leap 
Forward" in China between 1959 and 1962.' It probably generated the single largest loss 
of human life ever outside of war. Within a few months some 23 million (!) Chinese 
starved to death or were killed by famine-related diseases; another 20 to 30 million 
suffered severe malnutrition and were physically harmed for the rest of their life. The full 
magnitude of the disaster was covered up by the communist government for nearly 20 
Walter, J. and R. Schofield, Eds. 1989. Famine, Disease and the Sociul Order in Ear@ Modem 
Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Watkins, S.C. and J. Menken. 1985. Famines in historical perspective. Population and 
Development Review 11(4):647-675. 
' Komlos, J. 1988. On the role of crises in historical perspective. Population and Development 
Review 14(1):159-164. 
' Boyle, P.P. and C. 0 Grada. 1986. Fertility trends, excess mortality, and the Great Irish Famine. 
Demography 23543-562. 
Widespread undernutrition still prkvails in India, but serious famines have become rare. 
' Piazza, A. 1983. Trends in Food and Nutrient Availability in China, 1950-81. World Bank Staff 
Working Paper, No. 607. Washington, D.C. 
























